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The notion of business model has been used by strategy scholars to refer to “the logic of the 
firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders.” On the surface, this 
notion appears to be similar to that of strategy. We present a conceptual framework to separate 
and relate business model and strategy. Business model, we argue, is a reflection of the firm’s 
realized strategy. We find that in simple competitive situations there is a one-to-one mapping 
between strategy and business model, which makes it difficult to separate the two notions. We 
show that the concepts of strategy and business model differ when there are important 
contingencies upon which a well-designed strategy must be based.  Our framework also delivers 
a clear separation between tactics and strategy. This distinction is possible because strategy and 
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I. Introduction   
The field of Strategy has evolved substantially in the past twenty-five years.  Firms have 
learned to analyze their competitive environment, define their position, develop competitive 
and corporate advantages, and understand threats to sustaining advantage in the face of 
challenging competitive threats.  Different approaches including industrial organization, the 
resource-based view, dynamic capabilities, and game theory have helped academicians and 
practitioners understand the dynamics of competition and develop recommendations on how 
firms should define their competitive and corporate strategies. 
However, drivers such as globalization, deregulation, or technological change, just to mention a 
few, are profoundly changing the competitive game. Scholars and practitioners agree that the 
fastest growing firms in this new environment appear to have taken advantage of these 
structural changes to compete “differently” and innovate in their business models. IBM’s 2006 
and 2008 “Global CEO Study,” for example, show that top management in a broad range of 
industries are actively seeking guidance on how to innovate in their business models to 
improve their ability to both create and capture value.
1 
Advances in information and communication technologies have driven the recent interest on 
business model innovation. Many e-businesses constitute new business models. Shafer, Smith, 
and Linder present twelve recent definitions of business model and find that eight are related to 
e-business. Of course not all business model innovations are IT-driven; other forces, such as 
globalization and deregulation, have also resulted in new business models and fed the interest 
on this area.
2 
New strategies for the bottom of the pyramid in emerging markets have also steered researchers 
and practitioners towards the systematic study of business models. Academicians working in 
this area agree that for firms to be effective in such unique environments, they need to develop 
                                              
1 IBM Global Business Services, The Global CEO Study 2006, IBM Corporation, 2006; IBM Global Business Services, 
The Global CEO Study 2008, IBM Corporation, 2008. 
2 Evans and Wurster, “Strategy and the New Economics of Information,” Harvard Business Review, Sep.-Oct. 1997; 
Varian, H.R. and Shapiro, C., Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, HBS Press, 1999. Shafer, 
Scott M., H. Jeff Smith, and Jane C. Linder, “The Power of Business Models,” Business Horizons (2005), 48, pp.199-
207.  
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novel business models. In fact, socially motivated enterprises that aim to reach the bottom of 
the pyramid constitute an important source of business model innovations.
3 
Although it is uncontroversial that for organizations to thrive managers must have a good 
understanding of how business models work, the academic community has, so far, only offered 
early insights on the issue. In truth, there is not yet agreement on what are the distinctive 
features of superior business models. We believe that the dispute has arisen, in part, because of 
a lack of a clear distinction between the notions of strategy, business model, and tactics. The 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature by presenting an integrative framework 
to distinguish and relate the concepts of business model, strategy, and tactics.  
Put succinctly, business model refers to the logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it 
creates value for its stakeholders. Strategy refers to the choice of business model through which 
the firm will compete in the marketplace. Tactics refers to the residual choices open to a firm by 
virtue of the business model that it employs. 
To integrate the concepts of strategy, business model, and tactics, we introduce the generic two-
stage competitive process framework depicted in Figure 1. In the first stage, firms choose a 
“logic of value creation and value capture” (choose their business model). In the second stage, 
firms make tactical choices guided by their goals (in most cases, goals entail some form of 
stakeholder value maximization).  
Figure 1 







Figure 1 presents our organizing framework: the object of strategy is the choice of business 
model, and the business model employed determines the tactics available to the firm to compete 
against, or cooperate with, other firms in the marketplace. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we define and discuss the notion of business 
model and present a tool to represent business models. In Section III we study the second stage 
of the framework. Specifically, we present and discuss the notion of tactics and relate it to that 
business model. In Section IV, we move on to discussing the first stage, the strategy stage. 
                                              
3 Ricart, J.E., M. Enright, P. Ghemawat, S. Hart, T. Khanna, “New Frontiers in International Strategy,” Journal of 
International Business Studies, 2004. London, T. and S. Hart. (2003). “Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: 
Beyond the transnational model.” Journal of International Business Studies, Sept. 2004; Prahalad, C.K. and S. Hart. 
(2002). “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid.” Strategy & Business, 26: 2-14.  Hart, S. and C. Christensen. 
2002. “The great leap: Driving innovation from the base of the pyramid.” Sloan Management Review, 44(1): 51-56; 
Prahalad, C.K., The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits, Wharton School 
Publishing, Philadelphia, 2005.  
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Section V revisits the generic two-stage competitive process framework to integrate the three 
notions: strategy, business model, and tactics. We discuss the connection between strategy and 
business model and argue that both notions can be clearly separated. We develop a detailed 
example in Section VI. Section VII concludes.  
II. Business Model 
Defining Business Model 
The origins of the expression business model can be traced back to the writings of Peter 
Drucker, but the notion has gained prominence only in the last decade. While business model 
has been part of the business jargon for a long time, Markides points out that there is no widely 
accepted definition.
4 
Magretta defines business models as “stories that explain how enterprises work.” This author 
goes back to Peter Drucker and defines “a good business model” as the one that provides 
answers to the following two questions: Who is the customer and what does the costumer 
value? What is the underlying economic logic that explains how we can deliver value to 
customers at an appropriate cost? Magretta’s implicit idea is that business model refers to the 
logic by which the organization earns money. While not formal, Magretta’s approach highlights 
two fundamental questions that any business model should answer, one related to the value 
provided to the customer and the other to the organization’s ability to capture value in the 
process of serving customers.
5 
While Magretta’s definition is broad but imprecise, Amit and Zott’s is less ample (as it focuses 
on e-businesses) but precise. These authors review the contributions of several theories 
including virtual markets, Schumpeterian innovation, value chain analysis, the resource-based 
view of the firm, dynamic capabilities, transaction cost economics, and strategic networks. As 
they point out, every theory contributes elements to the notion but none, by itself, explains 
completely the nature of business models. Amit and Zott (2001) analyze a sample of U.S. and 
European e-business models to highlight the drivers of value creation and present the following 
integrative definition: “A business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of 
transactions designed so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities.” 
Transaction content refers to the goods or information being exchanged, as well as to the 
resources and capabilities required. Transaction structure refers to the parties that participate, 
their links, and the way they choose to operate. Finally, transaction governance refers to the 
way flows of information, resources, and goods are controlled by the relevant parties, the legal 
form of organization, and the incentives to the participants.
6 
                                              
4 Drucker, Peter, The Practice of Management, Harper and Row Publishers, 1954. A Google search of “Business 
Model” in May 2009 yielded 19.7 million hits. Markides, Costas. 2008.  Game-Changing Strategies: How to Create 
New Market Space in Established Industries by Breaking the Rules, Published by Jossey-Bass. 
5 Magretta, J., “Why Business Models Matter,” Harvard Business Review, May 2002. 
6 Amit, R. and Zott, C., “Value Creation in e-Business,” Strategic Management Journal, 22, 2001, pp 493-520; Zott, C 
and Amit, R., “Exploring the Fit Between Business Strategy and Business Model: Implications for Firm Performance.” 
Working Paper. (Revised, May 2006); Zott, C and Amit, R., “Business Model Design and the Performance of 
Entrepreneurial Firms,” Organization Science, Vol. 18, No. 2, March-April 2007, pp. 181-199. Amit, R. and Zott, C., 
“Value Creation in e-Business,” Strategic Management Journal, 22, 2001, pp 493-520. Page 511.  
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Building on their original definition, Zott and Amit (2010) propose an activity system 
perspective for the design of business models. They argue that activity systems capture the 
essence of business models and propose two sets of aspects that business model designers need 
to consider: design elements (content, structure, and governance) that describe the architecture 
of the activity system, and design themes (novelty, lock-in, complementarities, and efficiency) 
that describe the sources of value creation of the activity system.
7 
The common thread across all of these approximations to the notion of business model is 
captured well by Baden-Fuller, MacMillan, Demil, and Lecocq when they define business model 
as “the logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders.” We 
adopt their definition as the starting point for our argument.
8 
To make progress, we find it helpful to use the analogy of a machine.
9 Any given machine has 
a particular logic of operation (the way the different components are assembled and related to 
one another), it runs in a particular way and, in operating, it creates value for whomever uses 
it. For concreteness, consider an automobile. Every automobile has a particular logic of 
operation. For example, conventional automobiles operate quite differently than hybrids, and 
standard transmission automobiles operate differently than automatic transmission 
automobiles. Different automobile models create different value for their “stakeholders,” the 
drivers. Some drivers may prefer standard transmission. Others may prefer a small car that 
allows them to easily navigate the streets of a congested city. Yet others may prefer a large 
SUV with a powerful explosion engine to enjoy the countryside to the fullest. Different 
automobiles correspond to different business models in our analogy. Different automobiles have 
different particular logics of operation and create different value for their drivers. 
Automobiles are made of parts such as wheels, engines, seats, electronics, windshields, and the 
like. To create a new automobile and/or to make an assessment of how well a particular 
automobile works, one must consider its components and how they relate to one another. 
Likewise, to better understand business models, one needs to look at their component parts and 
understand how they relate to one another. The question arises: What are business models made 
of? We contend that business models are composed of two different sets of elements: (a) the 
concrete  choices made by management on how the organization must operate, and (b) the 
consequences of the choices. 
Choices include, but are not limited to, compensation practices, procurement contracts, location 
of facilities, assets employed, extent of vertical integration, or sales and marketing initiatives. 
Every choice has some consequence. For example, the provision of high-powered incentives (a 
choice) has implications regarding the willingness to exert effort or to cooperate with coworkers 
(consequences). Likewise, pricing policies (choices) have obvious implications regarding sales 
volumes, which in turn, affect the economies of scale and bargaining power enjoyed by the 
firm (two consequences). 
                                              
7 Zott, C. and R. Amit, “Designing Your Future Business Model: An Activity System Perspective”, Long Range 
Planning, 2009, this issue. 
8 See Long Range Planning call for papers for the Special Issue on “Business Models” by Charles Baden-Fuller, Ian 
MacMillan, Benoît Demil, and Xavier Lecocq. 
9 By machine we mean a mechanical device that transmits energy to perform tasks. Of course, real organizations are 
different from machines in many important respects but the comparison is helpful (especially when we contrast the 
notion of strategy to that of business model).  
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We distinguish three types of choices: policies, assets, and governance structures. Policies refer 
to courses of action that the firm adopts for all aspects of its operation. Examples of policies 
include opposing the emergence of unions, locating plants in rural areas, encouraging 
employees to fly tourist class, providing high-powered monetary incentives, or flying to 
secondary airports as a way to cut expenses. Assets refer to tangible resources such as 
manufacturing facilities, a satellite system for communicating between offices, or the use of a 
particular aircraft model by an airline. Governance of assets and policies refers to the structure 
of contractual arrangements that confer decision rights for policies or assets. For example, a 
given business model may contain as a choice the use of certain assets such as a fleet of trucks. 
The firm can own the fleet or lease it from a third party. Transaction cost economics suggests 
that seemingly innocuous differences in the governance of assets and policies may have 
dramatic effects on their effectiveness.
10 
In summary, we follow Baden-Fuller, MacMillan, Demil, and Lecocq and define business model 
as the logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders. To 
make the notion operational, we argue that business models are composed of choices (policies, 
assets, and governance) and the consequences derived from the choices. 
Example: Ryanair 
To illustrate our notion of business model and introduce a tool to represent business models, 
consider the famous case of Ryanair. Important choices in its business model include: flying to 
secondary airports, lowest ticket prices, low commissions to travel agents, standardized fleet of 
Boeing 737s, treating all passengers equally, high-powered incentives, no meals, nothing free, 
Spartan headquarters, and no unions.
11 
Consequences of these choices are: 
•  Secondary airports  low airport fees.  
•  Lowest ticket prices   large volume.  
•  Low commissions to travel agents  low cost.  
•  Standardized fleet of 737s  bargaining power with suppliers.  
•  All passengers treated equally  economies of scale.  
•  High-powered incentives  attracts combative team.  
•  No meals  faster turnaround.  
•  Nothing free  additional revenue.  
•  Spartan headquarters  low fixed cost.  
•  No unions  flexibility.  
                                              
10 Notice that intangible assets such as experience, brand equity, or even the value of patents are consequences 
(generally rigid), not choices. On transaction cost economics, see Oliver E. Williamson, The economic institutions of 
capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting. New York : Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan, c1985. 
11 Rivkin, Jan W.  (2000) “Dogfight over Europe: Ryanair (C),” Harvard Business School case 700-117.  
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A useful way to represent business models is by means of a causal loop diagram: choices and 
consequences linked by arrows representing causality (based on theories, as discussed above).
12 
Figure 2 is a representation of Ryanair’s business model. 
Figure 2 


















Figure 2 has choices underlined. The non-underlined elements are consequences. Consequences 
in boxes are “rigid,” those not in boxes are “flexible.” A consequence is flexible if it is sensitive 
to the choices that generate it. For example, “large volume” is a consequence of a policy of low 
prices. If the policy changes to high prices, volume is likely to fall rapidly. In contrast, a rigid 
consequence is one that does not change rapidly with the choices that generate it. For example, 
                                              
12 Baum, JAC. & Singh, JV. 1994. “Organization-Environment Coevolution.” Chapter 18 in Evolutionary Dynamics of 
Organizations, Baum, JAC. and Singh, JV. (eds). Oxford University Press, N.Y. There are many other ways in which 
business models may be represented. Standard tools in Strategy such as Andrews’ Strategy Wheel, Porter’s Value 
Chain and Activity System, McKinsey’s Business System and Value Delivery System are some of the most prominent 
examples. While these tools are truly helpful to understand competitive advantage, complementarities, and barriers 
to imitation, they are not ideal for our purpose. The reason is that it is hard to study tactical interactions between 
two particular firms by use of these tools.  
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a “reputation for ‘fair’ fares” is a consequence that changes only slowly with the choices that 
generate it.
13 
Recall the analogy of a business model and a machine. Figure 2 is a representation of how the 
Ryanair “machine” is assembled and how it works. There are many ways in which a machine to 
perform a given task can be designed and assembled: different levels of redundancy, specific 
mechanisms, quality of components, et cetera. Different machine configurations have different 
direct consequences affecting the overall level of efficiency of the machine (speed, input 
efficiency, noise, quality of output, and so on). Other airlines are “assembled” differently than 
Ryanair, they have a different logic, a different way to operate and to create value for their 
stakeholders. These different ways to “put together” airlines correspond to different business 
models.  
Business models often generate virtuous cycles, feedback loops that strengthen some 
components of the model in every iteration
. In the case of Ryanair, examples of virtuous cycles 
are: 
•  Virtuous cycle 1: lowest fares  large volume  bargaining power with suppliers  [low 
fixed cost]  lowest fares  … 
•  Virtuous cycle 2: lowest fares  large volume  high aircraft utilization  [low fixed 
cost/passenger]  lowest fares  … 
•  Virtuous cycle 3: lowest fares  low quality service expected  no meals  low variable 
cost  lowest fares  … 
While virtuous cycles are not part of the definition of a business model, they are crucial in their 
evaluation. As the cycles spin, rigid consequences become larger. If those rigid consequences 
are valuable, virtuous cycles develop valuable resources and capabilities. For example, as 
Ryanair’s volume increases (because of its low fares), bargaining power with its suppliers 
(airport authorities, Boeing, Airbus...) grows, resulting in improvements in Ryanair’s 
advantage.
14  
We should point out that the interconnection between elements in a business models is central also 
in Lecocq, Demil, and Warnier (2006). These authors develop a dynamic view of a business model 
focused on value creation/capture that they refer to as the RCOV Model. Their model has three 
interrelated components: Resources and Competences (RC), internal and external Organization (O), 
and Value propositions (V), connected in a virtuous cycle. The value propositions provide the 
volume and structure of revenues, while the internal and external organization provide the volume 
                                              
13 Perhaps a more tangible example is an “installed base of PCs” which is (partly) a consequence of prices set by Intel 
and Microsoft for the microprocessor and the operating system, respectively. As prices change, the installed base 
changes slowly: it is a rigid consequence. Clearly, no consequence is purely flexible nor purely rigid. All 
consequences are somewhere in between, it is a matter of degree. 
14 Technically, pathways of cause and effect can be vicious as well as virtuous. These synergetic relationships 
become negative when they are interrupted or, worse, reversed.  For example, a low cost virtuous cycle could become 
vicious if Ryanair’s employees unionized and it could no longer offer the lowest fares. It would then lose volume, 
and its aircraft utilization would fall. Since Ryanair’s investment in its fleet is based on the assumption of high 
utilization, such a change could have a magnified effect on the firm’s profitability.  In this case the synergy works in 
the opposite direction, quickly eroding competitive advantage. The possibility of virtuousness turning into 
viciousness is particularly important in competitive analysis because it is often the case that interaction with a 
competitor, such as another low cost airline challenging Ryanair’s pricing dominance, disrupts the pathway of cause 
and effect that the incumbent has established.  
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and structure of cost, thus jointly explaining margins. The authors emphasize the permanent 
interactions between the components of the business models.
15 
Simplifying Business Model Representations 
Complete business model representations are often too complex to write down and work with. 
As a consequence, the analyst is often forced to simplify when representing business models. 
There are two main ways to simplify to move from the full, true detail of a business model to a 
tractable representation: aggregation and decomposability.  
Aggregation. Aggregation works by bunching together detailed choices and consequences into 
larger constructs. For example, specific incentive contracts (which may be unique to every 
individual in the organization) may be bunched together into a choice called “high-powered 
incentives.” This captures the idea that, on average, contracts impose high-powered incentives 
onto the workforce. In the business model representation, instead of detailing every possible 
contract that the organization may offer, we simply write: high-powered incentives. This allows 
a simplified representation that enhances our understanding.  
We think of aggregation as “zooming out” and looking at the (real) business model from the 
distance. As the analyst zooms out, details blur and larger objects (aggregations of details) 
become clear.  If one keeps his nose close to every choice and consequence, it is impossible to 
see the larger picture and understand how the business model works. On the other hand, if one 
looks at the business model from very far away, all interesting details are lost. It is more an art 
than a science to find the “right distance” from which to assess a given business model. 
Figure 3 shows a highly aggregated representation of Ryanair’s business model.  
Figure 3 












                                              
15 Lecoq, X., B. Demil and V. Warnier, “Le Business Model, un Outil d’Analyse Stratégique”, L’Expansion 
Management Review, 123, 2006, p. 50-59.  
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Decomposability. Sometimes business models are decomposable in the sense that different 
groups of choices and consequences do not interact with one another and thus can be analyzed 
in isolation. In this case, depending on the question to be addressed, representing just a few 
parts of an organization’s business model may be appropriate.  
Discussion 
Two aspects of our development deserve further discussion.  First, note that our approach 
implies that every organization has some business model. This is because every organization 
makes some choices and these choices have some consequences. Of course, this does not mean 
that every business model is satisfactory or even viable in the long run. Other authors define 
business models normatively, implying that a business model has to consider particular aspects. 
For example, Johnson, Christensen, and Kagermann argue that business models consist of four 
elements: a customer value proposition, a profit formula, key resources, and key processes. 
Likewise, Chesbrough and Rosenbloon, to offer a “detailed and operational definition,” state 
that  
“the functions of a business model are to: articulate the value proposition, identify a 
market segment, define the structure of the value chain, estimate the cost structure and 
profit potential, describe the position of the firm within the value network, and formulate 
the competitive strategy.”
16 
Following a similar approach, Teece states that “[b]usiness model design involves assessments 
with respect to determining: (1) the identity of market segments to be targeted; (2) the benefit 
the enterprise will deliver to the customer; (3) the technologies and features that are to be 
embedded in the product and service; (4) how the revenue and cost structure of a business is to 
be ‘designed’ (and, if necessary, ‘redesigned’) to meet customer needs; (5) the way in which 
technologies are to be assembled and offered to the customer; and (6) the mechanisms and 
manner by which value is to be captured, and competitive advantage sustained. These issues are 
all interrelated. They lie at the core of the fundamental question asked by business strategists – 
which is how does one build a sustainable competitive advantage.”
17 
By defining business model normatively these authors offer valuable guidance on what 
managers should be thinking about when designing their business models. At the same time, 
the normative approaches are implicitly imposing bounds on what a complete business model 
is. Our notion is less demanding. We define business models independently of any features of 
goodness and/or effectiveness. We do not consider any a priori categories or variables.  
Second, according to our conceptualization, an organization’s business model is an objective 
(real) entity: choices are made in every organization and the choices have consequences. The 
particular set of choices (policies, assets, and governance) made by the organization and the 
associated consequences are the organization’s business model because they determine “the 
logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it creates value for its stakeholders.” An analyst 
                                              
16 Johnson, Mark, Clayton Christensen, Henning Kagermann. 2008. “Reinventing your business model.” Harvard 
Business Review and Christensen, Clayton, Mark Johnson. 2009. “What are business models, and how are they 
built?” Harvard Business School Note 9-610-019. Chesbrough, Henry and Ricahrd S. Rosenbloom, “The Role of 
Business Models in Capturing Value from Innovation: Evidence from Xerox Corporation’s Technology Spin-off 
Companies,” Industrial and Corporate Change (2002), Volume 11, Number 3, pp. 529-555 
17 Teece, David, “Business Model, Business Strategy, and Innovation,” Long Range Planning, 2009, this issue.  
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that studies a particular organization’s business model, however, will generally be unable to 
process the complete business model because it is often too complex (there are too many 
choices and consequences). Given this, the analyst proceeds by selecting what he or she 
believes are the key choices (a subset or the complete set of choices). The analyst then observes 
(or conjectures) the main consequences that are derived from those choices. In connecting 
consequences to choices, the analyst is effectively making use of theories (assumptions or 
beliefs) that provide a rationale for the links between choices and consequences. The resulting 
map of a subset of choices and consequences connected by the theories is a business model 




Tactics refers to the residual choices open to a firm by virtue of the business model that it 
employs. Consider Metro, the world’s largest newspaper measured by circulation. It is free and 
ad-sponsored and it is published in more than 100 cities in 18 countries. In each city it enters, 
it competes with local newspapers sold at positive prices. Being ad-sponsored, Metro chooses 
the advertising rates that it will charge to firms that wish to advertise in Metro. Metro also 
chooses: the precise number of pages that each edition of the newspaper has, the precise 
number of ads, the precise balance between news and opinion pieces, and so on. All of these 
choices are part of Metro’s tactics. Metro, however, cannot change “price of the newspaper” 
because its business model is ad-sponsored and the newspaper must be sold at zero price. Put 
differently, Metro’s business model precludes Metro from using “price of the newspaper” as a 
variable that can be changed depending on the intensity of competition and other external 
factors. Therefore, “price of the newspaper” is not part of Metro’s set of tactics.
19 
Or consider the case of the competition between Harvard Business School (HBS) and Stanford 
Graduate School of Business for MBA students. In the past few years, Stanford has initiated the 
offering of a “tailored MBA:” every student gets a personalized MBA curriculum, depending on 
his or her background and professional goals.  There is essentially no core curriculum. Given 
HBS’s business model, with classes of over 900 students, and sections of more than 90 students, 
with a strong core curriculum where new teaching materials are developed that end up being 
used in many of the school’s executive education programs, with several faculty members co-
teaching the core courses, and with assets such as classrooms with layouts set up for case 
discussions for large groups, it is just impossible for HBS to offer a personalized MBA similar to 
Stanford’s. HBS’s business model does not have as an element in its tactical set the offering of a 
“tailored MBA.” HBS could modify its business model so that this tactical choice would become 
available, but with the current business model it is not possible for HBS to match Stanford on 
                                              
18 For convenience, we make a slight abuse of language and refer to the business model representation as the 
business model of the organization. We should emphasize, however, that the actual business model is a highly 
complex entity that we can only represent through abstractions. Therefore, in the examples that we present below, 
when we talk about the organization’s business model, we are really working with our representation of the real, 
objective business model. 
19 Khanna, Tarun, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Anders Sjoman, Ane D. Jensen, Vincent Dessain. 2007. “Metro International 
S.A.” Harvard Business School Case 708-429.  
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this dimension. We conclude that different business models give rise to different tactics 
available for competition and/or cooperation.  
Why Are Tactics Important? 
Tactics play a crucial role in determining how much value is created and captured by firms.  In 
the case of Metro, for example, advertising rates and the precise number of ads displayed in the 
free newspaper end up affecting the readership and advertising revenues. Indeed, as more and 
more ads are included in Metro, readers become increasingly irritated and less willing to read 
the newspaper. Likewise, as the advertising rate increases, fewer advertisers will want to 
advertise in Metro and this will affect Metro’s revenues, profit, and value capture. Therefore, 
not only the business model employed by the firm determines tactics but also tactics play a 
central role in how much value the firm will be able to create and capture at the end of the day. 
To illustrate this point, let’s bring back the analogy between business models and automobiles 
introduced above. In that analogy the automobile was the business model. Of course, the way 
the automobile is built places constraints on what the driver can do (it determines the action set 
for tactics). For example, a large, powerful SUV makes it hard for a driver to maneuver on the 
narrow streets of Barcelona’s Gothic Quarter. A small, powerless compact car would make this 
task far less cumbersome and would create more value for the driver. As a matter of fact, there 
are tactics that are possible with the compact car (such as driving through a really narrow 
street) that would be impossible (not in the action set) with the large SUV (just as in the 
example of HBS and Stanford GSB). The SUV would create little value for the driver in this 
case. The shape of the automobile (an element on how the machine is built – its business 
model), places constraints to what the driver can do.  
Tactical Interaction 
We answered the question “why are tactics important?” by arguing that, at the end of the day, 
tactical choices determine how much value is created and captured by the firm. But there is 
more to tactics than the effect that they have on value creation and value capture to the firm 
employing them.  In reality, tactical choices also affect value creation and value capture of 
other firms with which the focal firm interacts. Tactical interaction refers to the way 
organizations affect each other by acting within the bounds set by their business models.  
Using the imagery of business model representations, tactical interactions occur when one 
firm’s business model is in contact with that of another firm.  When this happens, there are 
consequences in both firms business models where feedback to the rest of the system is 
determined not only by the focal firm’s choices, but by the choices of the other firm as well.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. When a discount retailer competes with 
the local mom-and-pop store, both firms engage in a tactical pricing battle to win customers. 
The interaction between the discounter and the mom-and-pop is captured in Figure 4, which 
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Figure 4 
Interaction between a discount retailer and a mom-and-pop store. Tactical price interaction is 















As the diagram shows, the discount retailer’s prices affect value capture for both the discounter 
and the mom-and-pop, and vice versa.
20 
The business model employed by a firm determines the tactics available to the firm to compete 
against, or to cooperate with, other firms in the marketplace. Therefore, business model and 
tactics are intimately related.  In the example of the discount retailer and the mom-and-pop, 
while both firms use prices in their tactical interaction, the discount retailer brings superior 
weapons to the fight because of the business model that it employs to compete.  Specifically, 
the range of prices it can profitably set is much broader than that of a competitor laden with a 
                                              
20 It is worth noting that at this level of aggregation the business models of the discounter and the mom-and-pop are 
composed of parallel but opposite choices.  The discounter has made little investment in quality service and the 
community but has emphasized infrastructure, whereas the mom-and-pop has emphasized service and the 
community at the expense of infrastructure.  Of course, a less aggregated depiction would show that the business 
models are not entirely parallel.  The differences in this case, however, clearly illustrate how firms use different 
strategic choices to compete in the same marketplace, leading to profit in different ways. The discounter’s choice to 
reinvest profits to attain large scale leads to purchasing power and low cost, enabling low prices that drive greater 
market share and profit.  The profit is again reinvested in scale, and the value loop continues virtuously.  The mom-
and-pop has a distinct strategy based on high-quality service and commitment to the community.  These choices 
lead to high labor costs, driving a high cost structure, and high costs constrain the mom-and-pop’s ability to 
compete on price.  But at the same time, the mom-and-pop derives some benefit from its commitment to the 
community (i.e., people are willing to pay a slight premium for shopping there), which may or may not be enough to 
overcome its cost disadvantage.  
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high-cost operating model. The battle is over before the combatants even engage – it is won at 
the business model level. 
IV. Strategy 
Defining Strategy 
Strategy is often defined as a contingent plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. 
As Caves and Ghemawat (1984) and Ghemawat (1991) point out,  an essential element of 
strategy is the set of “committed choices” made by management. Similarly, Porter (1996, p. 68) 
states: “strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of 
activities” (emphasis added). The word “creation” implies choice of the particular way in which 
the firm competes.  Moreover, the resulting activity system that is “created” is a reflection of the 
firm’s strategy. Strategy proper, however, is not the activity system itself but the creation of the 
activity system.
21  
Consistent with this notion, strategy refers, in our development, to the contingent plan as to 
what business model to use. Strategy is a high-order choice that has profound implications on 
competitive outcomes. Choosing a particular business model means choosing a particular way 
to compete, a particular logic of the firm, a particular way to operate and to create value for the 
firm’s stakeholders.  
Consider Ryanair once again. When Ryanair was at the brink of bankruptcy in the early 90s, 
their strategy was a plan of action to transform their business model from that of a standard 
full-service (though small) airline to a radically different one by adopting the Southwest’s no-
frills business model. In the mid 1990s, after the transformation had taken place, Ryanair had a 
new business model (a reflection of their strategy). Jan Rivkin vividly describes how in 1991, 
Ryanair’s top management considered four alternative plans of action to come out from near-
bankruptcy: (1) become the Southwest of Europe, (2) add business class, (3) become a “feeder” 
airline operating from Shannon’s airport, or (4) exit the industry. Each of the first three options 
entailed a different business model, a different “logic of the firm, the way it operates and how it 
creates value for its stakeholders.” The high-level election of “becoming the Southwest of 
Europe” (as opposed to adding business class or operating as a feeder airline) was strategy (a 
plan of action to create a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities). 
Furthermore, the particular way in which Ryanair executed such plans was its realized strategy. 
The resulting new Ryanair, with its new logic, new way to operate, and new way to create 
value for its stakeholders, was business model.
22 
In summary, strategy refers to the contingent plan as to what business model is to be used. The 
word “contingent” is of great importance. It means that strategies contain provisions as to what 
to do even for contingencies that may end up not taking place. For example, an incumbent firm 
facing a potential entrant in the industry will typically have as a strategy a plan as to what to 
                                              
21 Caves, Richard E., “Economic Analysis and the Quest for Competitive Advantage,” American Economic Review, 
Vol. 13, Jan. 1984: 127-132. See also Pankaj Ghemawat, Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy, Free Press, August 
15, 1991. Porter, Michael. 1996. “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review. 
22 Rivkin, Jan W.  (2000) “Dogfight over Europe: Ryanair (B),” Harvard Business School case 700-116.  
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do if the potential entrant enters the market and what to do if the potential entrant decides not 
to enter. Of course, only one of the two possibilities will end up happening: either the potential 
entrant enters or it stays out. An outside observer looking at the incumbent will only be able to 
observe the realized strategy. If the potential entrant stays out, the observer will see what the 
incumbent strategy prescribed as to what to do in the case of no entry. However, the observer 
will not be able to observe what the strategy prescribed in the case that the potential entrant 
actually entered.  What is observable is the realized strategy, not the entire strategy. 
V. Integrating Strategy, Business Model, and Tactics: The Generic 
Two-Stage Competitive Process Framework  
Having introduced the notions of strategy, business model, and tactics, we use the generic two-
stage competitive process framework to integrate and relate them. Figure 5 presents a more 
nuanced version of the generic two-stage competitive process framework (compared to 
Figure 1).   
Figure 5 













The figure shows that the notion of business model is related to but different than strategy. A 
strategy is a contingent plan of action as to what business model to use.  The available actions 
for strategy are choices (policies, assets, or governance structures) that constitute the raw 
material of business models. Thus, strategy entails designing business models (and redesigning 
them as contingencies occur) to allow the organization to reach its goals. Business models are 
reflections of the realized strategy. Similar to strategy, tactics are also plans of action. Tactics 
are courses of action that take place within the bounds drawn by the firm’s business model.   
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To cement the three notions, consider once again the automobile analogy. Recall that the 
automobile corresponds to the business model and that driving the automobile corresponds to 
tactics. Imagine now that prior to operating the automobile, the driver could modify the 
features of the car: shape, power, consumption, seats, A/C system… Such modifications would 
constitute “strategies” because they would change the machine (the “business model”). Thus, the 
design and building of the car is strategy; the car itself is the business model; and the driving 
of the car is tactics. 
Discussion 
(A) Strategy vs. Business Model 
We have argued that a firm’s business model is a reflection of its realized strategy. If this is the 
case, why do we need two separate notions? What do we gain from having two separate 
concepts? Specifically, if in the situation captured in Figure 5 we see that the firm competes 
through business model D, we then know the obvious fact that the firm’s strategy is to compete 
through business model D. In this case, it appears that little is gained from separating the two 
notions.
23 
Indeed, there is little to be gained from separating the two notions when there are no 
contingencies upon which to base the choice of business model because, in this case, there is a 
one-to-one mapping from strategy onto business models. This means that by looking at the 
business model, an outside observer knows the firm’s strategy. Essentially, strategy coincides 
with business model in this case. 
The substantive difference between strategy and business model arises when the firm’s plan of 
action calls for modifications to the business model (changes in policies and/or assets and/or 
governance) when particular contingencies take place. When this is the case, strategy and 
business model do not coincide – regardless of whether these modifications to the business 
model are minor or substantial.  
There are many possible sources of contingencies upon which strategies may be based. One 
such source is the realization of an event outside the control of the firm. For example, one 
contingency that many firms are currently considering is the possibility of a recovery from the 
recession. Firms have plans as to how their business models must be tweaked in the event of a 
strong economic recovery (changes in policies, assets, and/or governance). Such plans are part 
of the firms’ strategies. Note that by observing the current business model of a firm we do not 
know how that business model will be changed (as prescribed by the firm’s strategy) if the 
economy recovers. All that we observe is the current business model, which is what the firm’s 
strategy prescribes for the current state of the economy. Therefore, business model and strategy 
do not coincide in this case. 
Another source of contingencies upon which strategies may be based are actions by other 
industry players (competitors, complementors, buyers, or suppliers). Actions by other firms are 
                                              
23 While our focus has been on the deliberate aspects of strategy, the business model as reflection of realized strategy 
leaves the door open to consider the impact of emergent strategy on the configuration of a business model. A route 
we have only implicitly followed but clearly coherent with our proposed framework. 
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generally outside of the control of the focal firm. Consider Figure 5 and suppose, for 
concreteness, that the firm is an incumbent that has chosen to compete through business model 
A.   Suppose that the firm becomes aware of the possibility that a potential entrant enters the 
market to become a competitor. Suppose that it is not known for sure whether the potential 
entrant will enter or not. In this case, there is an important contingency upon which the 
incumbent’s plan of action (strategy) may be based. The contingency is whether or not the 
entrant enters.  
What is a strategy in this situation? A strategy is a contingent plan of action as to what 
business model to use depending on the resolution of the contingency. One possible contingent 
plan of action is: “if the potential entrant stays out, then I should stay put with business model 
A but if the potential entrant enters, then I should reconfigure my business model to B.”
24 
Suppose that the potential entrant stays out. Then, an external analyst will observe that the 
incumbent competes through business model A (as that is what the incumbent’s strategy 
prescribes when the potential entrant stays out). And as long as the potential entrant stays out, 
the analyst will not observe the incumbent’s full strategy because the contingency where the 
entrant enters and the incumbent responds by reconfiguring the business model to B has not 
occurred. 
To summarize, one crucial difference between strategy and business model is that business 
models are observable while strategies are not fully observable, unless the competitive 
situations are trivial (there are no contingencies upon which to base strategy choices). In the 
simple situations where strategy is fully observable, strategy “coincides” with the organization’s 
business model and little is gained from separating the two notions. An organization’s business 
model is the reflection of its realized strategy. Strategy is much more than the mere selection of 
a business model; it is a contingent plan as to how the business model should be configured, 
depending on contingencies that might occur. 
As a corollary, a second difference between strategy and business model is that while every 
organization has some business model (because every organization makes some choices and the 
choices have consequences) not every organization has a strategy. An organization has no 
strategy when it has no plan of action for the different contingencies that may arise.  
(B) Strategy vs. Tactics 
An issue that requires additional discussion is the difference between strategic choices (those 
choices that in the generic two-stage competitive process framework of Figures 1 and 5 occur 
in the “Strategy Stage”) and tactical choices (those choices that occur in the “Tactics Stage”).  
As mentioned above, we follow Caves and Ghemawat in their observation that an essential 
element of strategy is the set of “committed choices” made by management. Strategy choices, 
those that set the business model up, are often not easily reversible. This is not to say that 
strategy choices cannot be reversed or changed, but doing so is generally costly. We have 
distinguished three types of choices that fall into the category of strategic choices: policies, 
assets, and governance structures of assets and policies. Tactical choices, on the other hand, are 
                                              
24 As argued above, the difference between business models A and B may be minor or substantial. This is 
unimportant for our development. What is important is that there is at least one difference in policies or assets or 
governance between business models A and B.  
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relatively easy to change. Examples include: prices, advertising intensities, R&D intensities, 
minor modifications to products, and so on.  
Policy choices identify the particular way a firm intends to focus a particular activity or 
function. Walmart’s price policy is described by the motto “Every Day Low Prices.” However, 
the particular implementation of this policy in pricing decisions is tactical. Each store, 
depending on the local market conditions sets prices, coherent with the established policy, in a 
particular way. Asset choices identify the way the firm intends to invest and, therefore key 
organizational commitments. For instance, Walmart is committed to large investments in 
information technologies and distribution centers. The particular timing of the investments, the 
particular ways in which they are financed, et cetera, are tactical aspects to be decided later on 
in the game. Governance choices are the third category of business model choices. The use of 
high-powered incentives for store managers at Walmart, for example, is a strategy choice. The 
specific contract for a particular store manager is tactical. 
Consider the example of Metro. We have argued that choices such as the precise advertising 
rates, the precise number of pages that each newspaper edition has, the precise number of ads, 
the precise balance between news and opinion pieces, and so on, are all tactical choices. These 
are all choices that are adjusted (within the limits imposed by Metro’s business model), 
depending on market conditions. Examples of strategic choices include: being ad-sponsored 
and charging zero price for the newspaper, general policies (but not the exact number) as to 
how many ads Metro newspapers will carry, general policies (but not the exact ratio) on the 
balance between news and opinion pieces, general policies (but not the exact prices) on the 
rates that advertisers are charged, the choice of whether to own paper printing facilities or to 
outsource this function, et cetera. Strategic choices set up the business model. The business 
model places constraints on the tactics available to Metro to compete in the marketplace.
25 
To further illustrate the distinction, consider Teece’s description of Blockbuster’s reaction to 
Netflix’s entry as an online DVD rental service. Blockbuster eventually realized that to fight 
Netflix effectively, it had to go beyond simple tactical moves as enabled by its original business 
model and change the way the Blockbuster “machine” was set up to allow online rental 
combined with opportunities to return DVDs in the stores.
26 
In the analogy of the automobile, strategy is about changing features of the automobile such as 
shape, engine power, wheels, seats, et cetera. Tactics, however, are about what one does with 
the automobile, such as driving it fast or slow or with the windows down. Reconfigurations to 
the car are possible, but costly. Tactical changes are often easy to implement in the short term. 
                                              
25 While the distinction between strategy and tactical choices is clear in each particular example that we have 
presented, the level of aggregation that we use for a particular purpose can affect the conceptual separation about 
these two notions. This provides flexibility to the use of the framework. The analyst must use judgment in her choice 
of the right level of aggregation and her determination of the natural frontier between strategic and tactical choices. 
26 Teece, David, “Business Model, Business Strategy, and Innovation,” Long Range Planning, 2009, this issue. For 
additional examples, see: Markides, Costas. 2008.  Game-Changing Strategies: How to Create New Market Space in 
Established Industries by Breaking the Rules, Published by Jossey-Bass.  
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VI. An Example: TDC vs. Telmore
27  
In this section, we use the case of TDC vs. Telmore to illustrate our framework.  For clarity, we 
divide the exposition into subsections.  
Telmore entered the Danish mobile telecom market in October 2000 as a no-frills Mobile Virtual 
Network Operator (MVNO). The company was founded by a team around Frank Rasmussen and 
was located on the outskirts of Copenhagen. Prior to its launch, Telmore had struck an 
agreement with TDC, the largest network operator in Denmark, to act as a service provider on 
TDC’s network. TDC would charge Telmore DKK 0.50 per minute for using TDC’s network.
28  
(A) Illustration of the Notion of Business model: TDC and Telmore 
TDC was the largest network operator in the Danish market when Telmore entered the market. 
The most important choices in TDC’s business model are given in Table 1.  
Table 1 











                                              
27 For a detailed description and analysis of this case, see Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Celso Fernandez, and Moritz 
Jobke. 2007.“Launching Telmore (A).” Harvard Business School Case 708-414 and Teaching Note 708-520. Telmore, 
is a “library” case (meaning that the main source of information are publicly available materials). The teaching case 
version was co-written by Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Celso Fernandez, and Moritz Jobke (two HBS graduates). 
Moritz Jobke had consulted a German network operator that was considering entering the Danish mobile telephony 
market (were Telmore competed) at the time of Telmore’s successful entry. Therefore, even if we did not have access 
to management at Telmore, that case has an element of “field” research as Mr. Moritz interviewed several of the 
players and had deep knowledge of the issues faced by Telmore and the incumbents at the time of the case. 
28 With 42% market share of subscribers, TDC was the dominant player in the Danish mobile market. It was the 
mobile communications business of the former state-owned Tele Denmark.  TDC provided primarily fixed-line and 
wireless communication services in Denmark and possessed a sizable international business, which accounted for 
41.5% of its revenues in 2000.  
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Figure 6 puts together these choices and their most important consequences to represent TDC’s 
business model at a high level of aggregation. The figure shows how the TDC’s “machine” was 
set up, the logic of the firm. 
Figure 6 











There were many alternative business models available to Mr. Rasmussen when considering his 
entry into the Danish mobile telephony industry. Table 2 shows the most important business 
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Table 2 
Telmore’s business model choices. 
 
 
The representation in Figure 7 puts together all these choices and shows Telmore’s logic, by 
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Figure 7 

















Telmore’s business model resulted in a rock-bottom cost structure and a formidable competitive 
advantage for the segment of customers who looked for low price, transparency, a simple 
offering, and no commitments (customers who despised being locked into long-term 
agreements).  
(B) Illustration of the Notion of Tactics: Telmore 
As a no-frills competitor, an important choice in Telmore’s business model was its policy of 
“low prices.” Note that the policy does not prescribe a specific price, it just says that prices 
should be low. We do know, however, that the rate that Telmore paid TDC for the usage of its 
network was about DKK 0.50 per minute. This put a bound on how low Telmore’s prices could 
go. The implication is that Telmore’s MVNO business model prevented the company from 
setting prices below DKK 0.50 per minute; as such prices would be lower than marginal cost. 
This illustrates the crucial point that the tactical set was constrained by the business model. The 
precise rates charged by Telmore to its customers were tactics, the policy of low prices was a 
business model choice.   
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(C) Illustration of the Notion of Tactical Interaction: TDC and Telmore 
TDC and Telmore’s business models were interdependent. Figure 8 shows the many points of 
contact between TDC and Telmore’s business models. The arrows connecting both business 
models show the places where they affect one another. 
Figure 8 


















The most important points of contact were: 
1.  Volume. Telmore stole customers from TDC. Thus, Telmore’s presence decreased TDC’s 
customer base. Likewise, TDC’s acquisition of new customers decreased Telmore’s 
customer base (this effect was likely weaker that the former, however).  
2.  Handsets. The existence of a large number of TDC customers with handsets was a 
necessary condition for Telmore’s business model to function properly, as this group of 
users represented part of Telmore’s pool of potential new customers. This is because 
Telmore did not provide (nor subsidize) handsets for its customers.  
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3.  Willingness to pay. Telmore’s low price and simple offering decreased willingness to 
pay for some of TDC’s customers (for those customers that preferred an offering with 
features closer to Telmore’s).    
4.  Network. TDC’s investment in setting the network up was a necessary condition for 
Telmore’s ability to operate as an MVNO. By purchasing wholesale minutes from TDC, 
Telmore lowered TDC’s costs as TDC was able to increase its network utilization rate 
and spread its fixed costs among a larger user base.  
Because both business models were connected, tactical actions by one firm would affect how 
well the other firm’s business model worked. For example, the more TDC subsidized the 
acquisition of new handsets, the better Telmore’s business model would work because the pool 
of potential subscribers expanded. Likewise, Telmore’s low prices would attract customers from 
incumbents other than TDC and that would benefit TDC because Telmore paid TDC a per-
minute rate for the calls made by Telmore customers. And so on. 
(D) Illustration of the Notion of Tactics: TDC 
How could TDC react to the negative effects that Telmore’s presence had on TDC’s business 
model? There are two ways: tactical changes and strategic changes (business model 
reconfigurations). A few examples of tactical moves by TDC include:  
1.  Lower prices.  TDC could lower its prices, hence reducing its contribution margin.   
Lower prices would translate into a smaller loss of customers to Telmore, and could 
possibly expand the market as a whole.  
2.  Reduce subsidies for handsets.  TDC could reduce handset subsidies. However, such a 
move would go against the company’s goal of providing premium services. Enjoyment 
of such services required customers to own advanced handsets. 
3.  Reduce investments in network infrastructure.  The problem with this tactical move was 
that new network infrastructure was needed to offer the latest digital services, which 
was necessary to keep up with TDC’s policy of multiple products, plans, and services.  
4.  Reduce TDC’s cost structure.  TDC could decrease its advertisement costs, distribution 
costs, after-sale costs, and other costs in order to match the actual added-value 
provided to its customers in this new competitive environment. 
5.  Raise prices and offer more value-added services.  TDC could focus on serving higher-
value customers and extracting more value from them.  This response would let the 
price sensitive segment to be served by Telmore. TDC would earn money from this 
segment through Telmore (wholesale minutes). 
We note that none of these actions by TDC entails a change in business model. The logic of the 
firm does not change with tactical moves.  
(E) Illustration of the Notion of Strategy: Telmore 
There were many alternative business models that were available to Mr. Rasmussen when 
considering his entry into the Danish mobile telephony industry. Table 1 lists the actual  
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choices. Interestingly, many of Telmore’s choices were 180 degrees away from those of TDC. 
Table 3 shows some of the differences.  
Table 3 






This illustrates the notion that there are many different ways to compete in an industry and 
that business model innovation can pay off handsomely. 
As argued above, all that we can observe is the realized strategy; we do not observe the 
complete plan of action as to how Telmore’s business model was to be reconfigured contingent 
on actions by TDC and other industry players. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we know 
that Telmore never changed its business model at a time when there were many changes the 
industry. In all likelihood, there was little contingent planning at Telmore and Figure 7 
(Telmore’s business model) coincided with its strategy. 
(F) Illustration of the Notion of Strategy: TDC 
Telmore’s business model attracted a great deal of attention and new low-cost players entered 
the market soon after Telmore’s disruption. Entry triggered a ferocious price war. TDC rapidly 
lost subscribers and prices went into a downward spiral. Equity analysts came to the conclusion 
that TDC’s mobile business was under serious pressure and adjusted their expectations 
downward in anticipation of declining EBITDA margins. TDC knew it had to react.  
The range of tactical moves allowed by TDC’s business model (some of which we have described 
above) was not sufficient for TDC to effectively confront the no-frills entrants. Indeed, TDC 
eventually created a “no-frills” service provider. And in 2003, TDC acquired Telmore for about 
DKK 400 million. Telmore continued to be run as a separate brand within TDC. Most 
importantly, control over pricing was now in TDC’s hands. This was a fundamental change in 
TDC’s business model. From that moment on, TDC had a dual business model, in the 
terminology introduced by Markides.
29 Note that this is a change in TDC’s business model as it 
entails a new, different set of choices (policies, assets, and governance). The key point here is 
that TDC confronted the new competitors through strategy rather than (or in addition to) tactics, 
by modifying its business model. 
                                              
29 A dual business model refers to a situation where a firm offers two products each through a different business 
model. See Markides, Costas. 2008.  Game-Changing Strategies: How to Create New Market Space in Established 
Industries by Breaking the Rules, Published by Jossey-Bass. Market analyst speculated that it was less the acquisition 
of additional revenue and/or cash flow that prompted TDC to take action, but rather the urge to stop the decline in 
prices and revenue that threatened to destroy its business models.  
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
We have presented a framework that allows a simple integration of the notions of strategy, 
business model, and tactics. In our formulation, strategy and business model, though related, 
are different concepts. A business model is the direct result of strategy but it is not strategy 
itself.  
Our framework distinguishes between tactics and strategy. This separation is possible because 
strategy and business model are different constructs. Tactical interaction (organizations 
affecting each other when acting within the bounds set by their business models) has well-
defined rules of play (action sets are well-understood, the mapping from actions to payoffs are 
easy to discern, and best responses can be easily figured out) because business models constrain 
the tactical sets and game theory can be easily applied to predict competitive dynamics and 
outcomes. Strategic interaction (organizations affecting each other through strategy; that is, by 
changing their business models) is more complex. First, the rules of the game are not well-
defined in this case as there are few constraints as to how business models can be assembled. 
Second, the mapping between strategic choices and payoffs are much more complicated than in 
the case of tactics because for every modification in the business model, the designer needs to 
assess the effects that it will have on tactics (as the final payoffs are always determined as the 
outcome of tactical interaction). Finally, it is usually hard to predict how a rival will react to a 
particular set of strategic moves as, for all practical purposes, best-responses become impossible 
to pin down.  
The proliferation of managerial books on strategy innovation is related to the difficulty in 
deriving best responses for strategy. Much of the recent managerial literature on innovation is 
concerned with altering business models (even as it often refers to business models 
superficially). Yip claims that strategy practice can gain light by understanding business 
models. Recent authors such as McGrath and McMillan or Govindojaran and Trimble develop 
techniques to help companies come up with such strategies. Even authors from operations 
management such as Hau L. Lee point out that radical changes in some parts of a firm’s 
business model can have tremendous performance implications.
30 
We conclude that the exercise of designing new business models is closer to an art than to a 
science. From an academic point of view, we believe that having clear definitions of the 
constructs that we employ and analyze is a necessary condition for progress in the field. From 
the practitioners’ perspective, it is our hope that having an integrative framework that cleanly 
separates the realm of strategy, business models, and tactics will help guide the search of novel, 
interesting, and profitable new ways to compete.  
 
                                              
30 Yip, George S., “Using Strategy to Change your Business Model,” Business Strategy Review, Vol. 15, #2, Summer 
2004. McGrath, Rita Gunther, Ian C. Macmillan, MarketBusters: 40 Strategic Moves That Drive Exceptional Business 
Growth, Harvard Business School Press, 2005. Govindajaran, Vijay and Chris Trimble, Strategic Innovation and the 
Science of Learning, MIT Sloan Management Review, Winter 2004. Lee, Hau L., “The Triple-A Supply Chain,” 
Harvard Business Review, October 2004.  